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Introduction
Derivative instruments, such as interest rate swaps and credit
default swaps, are mainly traded in over-the-counter (OTC)
markets, meaning dealers and clients trade bilaterally.  As part
of a G20 commitment to improve transparency and mitigate
systemic risk in these markets, many OTC derivatives will be
required to be traded on exchanges or electronic platforms by
the end of 2012.  It is important that liquidity on the new
trading platforms is resilient, both during normal and stressed
market conditions.  This article explains how liquidity is
provided in different trading models and how resilient liquidity
provision is likely to be in stressed market conditions.
Derivatives play a key role in the financial system as hedging
instruments, allowing businesses and financial institutions to
reduce their risk exposures.  Trading of derivatives creates a
network of counterparty credit risk exposures between market
participants.  These interconnections also create fragilities in
the system (Tucker (2011)).
Trading in OTC derivatives markets is facilitated by dealers at
global banks who act as market makers and provide liquidity to
end-users.  In stressed market conditions, market participants
may be inclined to scale back their trading, resulting in reduced
liquidity, and consequently greater cost to end-users seeking
to hedge risks.  
Liquidity will be more resilient in a market where participants
have confidence in their ability to manage counterparty
exposures.  And, if the network of exposures is well
understood, both the risks to individual participants and the
risk of system-wide contagion can be mitigated more
effectively.  The Bank’s new Financial Policy Committee (FPC)
is charged with identifying, monitoring and taking action to
remove or reduce systemic risks with a view to protecting and
enhancing the resilience of the UK financial system.(2) Hence,
the FPC has an interest in promoting the robustness of
systemically important markets.  Trading models are an
important component of the infrastructure supporting those
markets.
In January 2009, the G20 asked for substantial reforms to 
OTC derivatives markets in order to ‘improve transparency,
mitigate systemic risk, and protect against market abuse’.  The
G20 reform agenda requires standardised OTC derivatives to
be cleared through central counterparties (CCPs) so they can
benefit from consistent and transparent risk management.  It
calls for the establishment of trade repositories that will
collect detailed transaction data, thus providing valuable
information about both individual and aggregate exposures.
The G20 reform agenda also mandates that OTC derivatives be
traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms.  In the
United States, the trading requirement is being implemented
as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, with the Commodity Futures
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Trading Commission and the Securities and Exchange
Commission in charge of rule making;  in Europe it is part of
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) review
led by the European Commission.  The requirements will apply
to the most actively traded instruments.  Less actively traded
derivatives may continue to be traded bilaterally.
Trading of OTC derivatives instruments currently relies on
bilateral relationships between a relatively small group of
dealers who act as liquidity providers for their customers.
Transactions are often bespoke and may be of a very large size.
Dealers may need time to offset the customer trades they take
on.(1) Exchange-based trading of derivatives remains relatively
low (Chart 1) and is limited to highly standardised futures and
options contracts.  Most OTC derivatives transactions are
executed using so-called voice-based methods, either via the
telephone or internet messaging.  Electronic trading of OTC
derivatives remains limited in its uptake, although it is growing
rapidly. 
The remainder of this article is organised as follows.  The
second and third sections describe trading arrangements in
OTC derivatives markets.  The fourth section discusses how
various trading models differ in terms of transparency, access,
and ability to customise client trades.  Drawing on the
academic literature, it analyses whether these differences
matter for liquidity and liquidity resilience, highlights where
there are trade-offs, and describes the specific role of dealers.
The final section concludes.   
OTC derivatives markets:  general features
Dealers and their clients
Traditionally, most derivatives have been traded over the
counter, meaning that dealers and clients trade bilaterally.  The
OTC derivatives markets have evolved in this way because
clients have historically wanted to trade bespoke products,
that is derivatives that are tailored to the specific requirements
of the client.  For instance, a firm wanting to hedge the interest
rate risk on a two-year loan that it is due to take out in 
six months’ time, may want to use an interest rate swap
specifically customised to these dates.  Standardised products,
such as interest rate futures, may not perfectly match the
client’s requirements, exposing them to residual interest rate
risk that they are unprepared to take on.  Similarly, an asset
manager may want to hedge the interest rate risk associated
with a specific bond they own, and may want to use an
interest rate swap with the same maturity date and 
fixed-coupon rate.  
As each client has their own unique hedging requirements, it 
is highly unlikely that two clients will want to trade the 
exact same derivatives contract with each other at the same
time.  So these dealers act as intermediaries, allowing clients
with diverse requirements to trade in a timely fashion.  
Clients often have long-standing relationships with several
dealers. 
When trading with a client, the dealer takes on the other side
of the client trade.  The dealer may hold this position in his
inventory until he finds a broadly offsetting trade with another
client or with another dealer(s) in the interbank market, also
referred to as the inter-dealer market.  Here dealers trade with
one another only. 
Dealers often hedge their market risk on bespoke client trades
with more liquid market-standard contracts.  In the example
above, the dealer might hedge the two-year interest rate swap
starting in six months’ time with a ‘vanilla’ two-year or 
three-year interest rate swap in the interbank market.  This
leaves the dealer with residual interest rate risk, which they are
better placed to monitor and manage than their clients.  In
Europe, dealers also use Euribor futures contracts and German
bund futures contracts to hedge client positions.  These futures
markets are highly liquid and allow dealers to hedge their
interest rate risk quickly and at low cost.  They are usually
closely correlated with interest rate swaps.  Because dealers
have confidence they can hedge their interest rate risk in these
futures markets, they are more willing to provide liquidity to
clients in the swaps market.  
Other factors affect the intermediation services that dealers
provide to their clients, besides their ability to hedge in related
markets.  One factor is the competition for client business (see
also the section on dealer competition).  Dealers with a greater
market share tend to earn more from trading, gain more
information on trading flows (including from those clients 
who are perceived to have greater ability to forecast price
movements), and have a greater ability to cross-sell or 

















Chart 1 Gross notional amount outstanding of OTC and
exchange-traded derivatives by asset class(a)
Source:  BIS.
(a) As at June 2011.
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cross-subsidise different investment bank business (such as
syndicated primary debt issuance).  
Dealers’ willingness to act as intermediaries also depends on
the volatility of market prices and dealers’ own risk appetite.
Dealers accumulate positions by virtue of their trading with
clients, and these positions fluctuate in value.  In volatile
markets, dealers tend to quote wider bid-ask spreads to
protect themselves against the possibility that prices may
move sharply after they trade with a client (but before they
have had the chance to hedge).(1)
Size of the market
According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the
total notional amounts outstanding of OTC derivatives as of
June 2011 was just over US$700 trillion, with interest rate
swaps accounting for US$554 trillion, followed by FX swaps
(US$65 trillion), credit default swaps (US$32 trillion), and
equity and commodity derivatives (US$6.8 trillion and 
US$2.7 trillion, respectively) (Chart 2).(2) Average daily
turnover in OTC interest rate derivatives was US$2.1 trillion 
in April 2010, with interest rate swaps accounting for 
US$1.3 trillion.(3)
Trading in OTC derivatives tends to be dominated by the large
global dealers.  As an example, Chart 3 shows that interest
rate swap transactions between the major OTC derivatives
dealers (commonly referred to as the G14 dealers) make up
around 57% of all outstanding contracts. 
Competition among dealers is typically higher for the more
liquid products;  for less liquid, less actively traded contracts,
dealer concentration tends to be higher and competition
lower.  This is illustrated in Chart 4 which shows that as the
number of credit default swap trades per day declines, the
number of participating dealers also falls.
Finally, trading volumes in OTC derivatives are skewed, with
only a few contracts attracting high trading volumes.  As an
illustration, Chart 5 shows that just over 90% of all credit
default index transactions trade fewer than 50 times a day,
and just below 90% of all single-name credit default swaps
trade less than 50 times a week. 
How OTC derivatives are traded
Currently, OTC derivatives are mainly traded in so-called
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Chart 2 Gross notional amounts outstanding of 
OTC derivatives(a)
Source:  BIS.
















Chart 3 Gross notional amount outstanding by
counterparty type(a)(b)
Source:  TriOptima.
(a) G14 dealers are the group of fourteen international banks that have signed up to meet the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s regulatory commitments.
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Chart 4 Trading frequency of CDS index entities against
average number of dealers(a)(b)
Source:  DTCC Trade Information Warehouse.
(a) Each marker represents a single reference entity of index credit default swaps (CDS) plotted
against the average number of dealers clearing the entity per month (y-axis) and the average
number of trades per day (x-axis).
(b) From 20 December 2010 to 19 March 2011.
(1) The bid-ask spread, also referred to as the bid-offer spread, is defined as the difference
between the prices at which the dealer is willing to buy and sell.
(2) The total amount outstanding of OTC derivatives also includes other unallocated
contracts with a notional value of US$46 trillion as at June 2011.  
(3) Numbers for daily turnover differ from the printed version of the Bulletin, which
reported the incorrect numbers.334 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q4
which they would be willing to trade with their counterparts.
A trade takes place when a counterparty (a customer or
another dealer) contacts the quoting dealer and they both
agree to the deal — often the quoted price is merely indicative
and may be improved upon through bilateral negotiation.
OTC derivatives share this market structure with foreign
exchange, government and corporate bond, and structured
product markets. 
In contrast to OTC derivatives, most stocks and futures are
traded in so-called order-driven markets.  In these markets,
orders are submitted to a central limit order book which lists
all outstanding buy and sell orders.  A trade is executed if it can
be matched against an existing order in the book;  if not, the
order will join the list and wait for a new offsetting trade to
arrive.(1) The two market structures overlap, however, with
some government bonds trading in an order-driven
environment, and many stock exchanges offering quote-driven
segments, for example for less liquid, smaller-capitalisation
stocks.
Historically, most trading of OTC derivatives has taken place
via voice execution, which refers to both telephone and
internet-based messaging.  With the increase in electronic
trading of other products (notably foreign exchange, equities
and highly liquid government bonds), some OTC derivatives
trading has started to gravitate towards electronic trading
venues, some relying on quote-driven models, others on 
order-driven models.  IOSCO (2011) estimates that in 
June 2010 around 12% of interest rate swaps and just below
17% of all credit default swaps were traded electronically.  
The transformation mandated by the G20 has two dimensions
— a technology dimension and a market structure dimension.
The former involves automating aspects of the trading process.
The latter involves changes in the trading model:  whether to
replace bilateral trading with multilateral trading and whether
to choose a quote-driven or an order-driven model.  These
choices are facilitated by technology and are evident in the
variety of trading models that are being developed. 
The remainder of this section describes a variety of electronic
trading models for OTC derivatives.  Some are currently in use,
others are still being developed.  The discussion starts with a
model that mimics many of the features of bilateral voice
trading — the single-dealer platform — and ends with 
inter-dealer platforms that are very close to the central limit
order book operated on exchanges.
What are the main trading models?
Single-dealer platforms (SDPs): These are proprietary
electronic trading systems offered by individual dealers for
trading with their clients.  Dealers display firm buy and sell
prices for various standard swap maturities which are tradable
up to a certain trading volume.  The client can trade by
selecting the desired maturity shown on screen, whether 
they want to buy or sell, and the size of the trade.  This is the
‘click to trade’ method of execution.  
Clients may also use SDPs to trade bespoke interest rate
swaps, ie those instruments that are not market standard and
therefore not shown on screen.  To do so, the client must key
in the desired maturity dates, along with other customisable
fields, and their intention to buy or sell.  The client’s enquiry is
sent to the dealer who provides a price in response.  This is the
‘request for quote’ (RFQ) method of execution:  clients ask the
dealer for a quote and can then choose whether or not to
trade.  
Operators of SDPs grant access to clients on request (and by
the same token, can restrict access to select clients).  As the
name suggests, clients only see a single dealer’s prices.  Trading
a swap via an SDP is similar in many ways to trading by voice,
in that it represents a bilateral trade agreement between two
participants that is not observed by the rest of the market.
Hence, the SDP is an example of a quote-driven model.
Dealers are also able to tailor the pricing they show to
different customers.
A client with access to more than one SDP will need to contact
each platform individually to find a suitable quote.  Electronic
solutions are being developed to reduce the resulting search
costs.  So-called aggregation tools allow clients to view the
prices of all the dealers whose individual platforms they are
allowed to access in an easy to use format.
Under proposed US and European regulations, SDPs in their
current form may no longer be eligible to trade standardised
(1) There is a parallel with auction theory with the quote-driven model corresponding to
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Chart 5 Cumulative distribution of average number of
trades for CDS index(a) and single name(b)(c)
Source:  DTCC Trade Information Warehouse. 
(a) Average daily transactions for 125 CDS index contracts.
(b) Average weekly transactions for 1,000 single-name CDS contracts.
(c) From 20 December 2010 to 19 March 2011.Research and analysis OTC derivatives markets:  trading models and liquidity 335
OTC derivatives.  Instead, market participants may need to
trade eligible instruments on multi-dealer trading platforms
described next.  
Multi-dealer request for quote (RFQ) model: These are
systems that provide buy and sell prices to clients for various
standard swap maturities.  The user’s screen looks similar to
the single-dealer’s screen, except that the prices are based on
submissions from a number of contributor dealers.  Trade
volumes are also not shown and prices are not attributable to
a certain dealer.  Clients may send requests to several dealers
for firm quotes and then select the most favourable price.  
Like the single-dealer platform, the multi-dealer RFQ is an
example of a quote-driven model.  Existing multi-dealer RFQ
systems allow customers to request a quote from only one
dealer, if they do not wish to reveal their trading intentions too
widely.  This allows the customer to transact in a similar way
to how they would on a single-dealer platform, although the
customer retains the ability to trade with more than one dealer
if they wish to.   
Multi-dealer limit order book model: These systems allow
dealers to post firm buy and sell limit orders at various
standard swap maturities.  Customers can trade if they find a
suitable limit order in the book, but cannot enter limit orders
themselves.  The full depth of the book is visible, so customers
can view all the limit orders at a point in time, not just the best
bid and offer.  Customers need permission from the respective
dealers to access the platform.  This model is still being
developed for trading OTC derivatives.  It is an example of an
order-driven model, but as will be explained below, differs
from the central limit order book model operated on
exchanges.
Inter-dealer limit order book model: In the interbank market,
a limit order book model, operated by interbank brokers, has
emerged.  Dealers provide continuous prices in the form of
limit orders for standard swap maturities, and these form the
basis of a centralised order book.  Access to the electronic
trading platform is limited to dealers only, so clients can
neither post, nor trade on outstanding limit orders.  As in the
multi-dealer limit order book model described above, the full
depth of the limit order book is visible, so dealers can view all
outstanding limit orders.  After trades are executed, the traded
price is shown to all participants but not the volume traded.
And unlike the multi-dealer limit order book model outlined
above, orders displayed are anonymous.  Another difference
with the multi-dealer limit order book model is that the users
of the system — exclusively dealers in this case — can both
post limit orders to the limit order book and trade on existing
orders.   
At present, this inter-dealer limit order book complements
voice trade execution offered by the interbank brokers,
effectively creating a hybrid model.  Dealers can submit their
orders to the limit order book, trade via voice, or do both.
Market participants note that smaller and more standardised
inter-dealer trades are increasingly executed on limit order
books, whereas larger or more bespoke trades continue to be
done via voice.  Indeed, a distinguishing feature of the 
inter-dealer market is the flexibility to trade large sizes
bilaterally, away from the screens.  These trades are known as
‘block trades’.  Regulators are currently debating where the
block-trade threshold should be set for OTC derivatives.  
Central limit order book: Finally, on futures exchanges, 
so-called central limit order books provide full and open access
to all interested trading parties.  Trading is anonymous, with
the order book showing firm prices and trade sizes to all
participants.  Dealers are no longer the sole liquidity providers
— both dealers and their clients can submit limit orders and
thus add liquidity to the market.  There is no price
discrimination and no opportunity to customise trades.  But as
in other exchange-type environments, liquidity depends on the
timely arrival of orders from market participants.  Hence, this
model critically relies on the existence of a deep pool of buyers
and sellers — conditions likely to be the case in only the most
liquid contracts (IOSCO (2011)).  And in stressed market
conditions, liquidity may be less resilient as trading interest
may be thinner.  For this reason, some futures exchanges rely
on designated participants to provide continuous quotes
and/or liquidity.  
To summarise, the OTC derivatives market is characterised by
a variety of trading models.  These include quote-driven
models (single-dealer platforms and multi-dealer request for
quote models) and order-driven models (the inter-dealer limit
order book), alongside voice-based trading.  The multi-dealer
limit order book model is under development as banks prepare
for the implementation of the G20 commitments.   
Table A provides a brief summary of the trading models
discussed in this section.
Trading models and liquidity
This section discusses how the various models differ in terms
of pre and post-trade transparency, access, and ability to
customise client trades.  It further assesses whether these
differences matter for liquidity and liquidity resilience.  In
doing so, the section draws on the academic literature on
dealer markets.  
Pre-trade transparency
Pre-trade transparency refers to the information available to
market participants prior to executing a trade, including price
quotes and trade sizes.  Pre-trade transparency differs across
trading models.  It is highest in the central limit order book,
followed by inter-dealer and multi-dealer limit order books336 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q4
which display tradable prices and sizes from a number of
market participants simultaneously.  It is a little lower on
multi-dealer RFQ models, where participants need to contact
several dealers in order to compare price quotes.  And it is
lowest on single-dealer platforms and in bilateral trading 
since market participants only see the prices or quotes of 
one dealer at a time, although earlier-mentioned search tools
help participants bring together information from different
sources.  
Hence, the G20 mandated move from bilateral voice-based
trading to electronic platform trading is likely to entail an
increase in pre-trade transparency.  While this reduces search
costs and in turn the cost of trading, it may also have
implications for liquidity provision.  Here the academic
literature usefully highlights the various incentive effects at
play.(1)
First, the literature makes a distinction between informed and
uninformed traders (see the box on page 337).  Uninformed
traders tend to benefit from seeing prices and trade sizes, as it
reduces their adverse selection risk — namely the risk of losing
money in a trade with a better informed counterparty.  Hence,
everything else equal, uninformed traders will prefer to trade
in the more transparent setting, in turn contributing to
liquidity.  
Greater pre-trade transparency can, however, affect the
incentives of informed traders who often act as liquidity
providers.  Market structure theory shows that greater 
pre-trade transparency can deter these traders from providing
liquidity, for example if it reduces the returns they earn on
their research.  Yet, the theory also shows that greater 
pre-trade transparency reduces strategic behaviour among
informed dealers, encouraging them instead to compete more
and improve upon each others’ quotes, thus reducing
transaction costs and improving liquidity. 
In sum, the impact of increased pre-trade transparency
remains ambiguous, with some empirical studies showing a
reduction in liquidity, and others the opposite.(2) While
increased use of electronic trading platforms is likely to entail
an increase in pre-trade transparency, it is difficult to predict
its precise impact on liquidity provision.
Post-trade transparency
Post-trade transparency refers to the information about
executed trades made available to market participants other
than the two parties involved in the trade, or a narrow set of
dealers.  This typically includes prices and volumes, and may
involve a reporting delay.  In quote-driven markets, post-trade
transparency has traditionally been low, although there are
notable exceptions, such as US corporate bond markets.  In
contrast to pre-trade transparency which is an intrinsic
characteristic of the trading model (see the section on 
pre-trade transparency above), post-trade transparency can be
achieved in the form of reporting requirements, independent
of trading venue.
Greater post-trade transparency is generally considered to
reduce information asymmetries, thus contributing to
improved price discovery and liquidity.  At the same time,
greater disclosure of trade information may discourage
informed traders from trading, which could reduce liquidity.  In
common with pre-trade transparency, greater post-trade
transparency may also reduce incentives for informed market
participants to gather information (eg by conducting research)
and bring their trades to the market, thus weakening price
discovery.
An additional consideration in dealer markets is that 
post-trade transparency may reveal information about dealers’
inventory positions.  This in turn makes it more difficult for
dealers to unwind their positions.(3) Hence, the concern that
greater transparency may lead to an increase in inventory risk
and in turn to a deterioration in liquidity provision in the
customer-to-dealer market (Gravelle (2002)). 
Inventory risk is a particular concern in less-actively traded
contracts, as it may take the dealer longer to unwind his
inventory.  It is also more pronounced for large trade sizes.
Recognising these issues, many reporting regimes allow for the
delayed reporting of large, so-called block trades.   
Table A Summary of trading models
Single-dealer models
Click-to-trade model: an electronic platform which allows clients to execute trades 
against firm prices posted by a single dealer.
Request for quote model: an electronic platform which allows clients to request firm 
quotes from a single dealer for a specific transaction.
Multi-dealer models
Limit order model: an electronic platform which lists buy and sell orders in a limit 
order book — only dealers are allowed to enter limit orders;  
participating clients may trade against posted orders.
Request for quote model: an electronic platform which allows clients to request firm 
quotes from multiple dealers simultaneously.
Inter-dealer limit order book model
a limit order book model, operated by interbank brokers;  no 
client access.
Central limit order book model
a limit order book model which provides full and open access 
to all interested trading parties.
Hybrid model
a trading model which combines electronic platform trading 
with bilateral voice-based trading.
(1) See Biais et al (2006) for a useful overview of transparency studies considered in this
section.  
(2) See for example Gravelle (2002).
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Platform access, price discrimination and
customisation
Electronic platforms also differ in terms of access, with many
platforms limiting access to selected market participants.
Access to a SDP is often part of the trade execution services
offered to clients (alongside pre-trade research and post-trade
processing).  Likewise, multi-dealer platforms can set access
restrictions.  Moreover, both models allow dealers to use their
discretion and offer different prices to different customers.
They can also customise trades, giving clients flexibility (eg in
terms of contract size, maturity or other trade characteristics).
In sum, access criteria, price discrimination and customisation
options feature in both single and multi-dealer models, and it
is not clear ex ante how much the two models differ in this
respect.   
In the inter-dealer market, current electronic models restrict
access to dealers only.  But a distinct feature of the inter-dealer
limit order book model discussed in the third section is that
trading is anonymous, so there is no price discrimination.  As
mentioned earlier, current inter-dealer limit order books list
the more standardised swap contracts only.  Trading of
bespoke contracts continues to be done almost exclusively via
voice execution.
Finally, central limit order book models, as used on futures
exchanges, offer unlimited access, limited customisation and
no price discrimination.
On the one hand, broad access has so-called liquidity-pooling
benefits, bringing together a larger number of actual (or
potential) buyers and sellers.  On the other hand, broad access
Market microstructure theory(1)
Market microstructure theory aims to understand the process
of price formation by modelling the trading process, ie the
precise mechanism by which buyers and sellers meet and
agree on a price.  In doing so, market microstructure theory
recognises that prices may not just reflect fundamentals, but
also the characteristics of buyers and sellers (their risk
preferences and individual knowledge), the characteristics of
the trading rules (ie how buy and sell orders are matched), and
the characteristics of trading venues (ie where buyers and
sellers meet).  
In a liquid market, buyers and sellers can trade with minimal
delay.  Both large and small orders can be accommodated and
without causing large price swings.  A market has resilient
liquidity if these properties are maintained, even when prices
become more volatile and/or investors more risk-averse.
Market makers contribute to market liquidity by their
willingness to buy and sell, building up and running down an
inventory of positions.  In return, they expect to earn the 
bid-ask spread.  But markets are not always liquid, and some
are more liquid than others.  The market microstructure
literature attributes these differences to information
asymmetries on the one hand, and execution uncertainty on
the other.
Information asymmetries
These can give rise to adverse selection risk:  when trading with
better informed counterparts, uninformed participants are at
risk of making the wrong trading decision.  An uninformed
market maker faces this risk too, but can protect himself by
widening his bid-ask spread.  
Informed traders may reveal some of their private information
through their trading actions.  It follows that uninformed
traders can learn valuable information simply by observing the
order flow (defined as the sum of all trades during a given time
interval).  
The order flow is a noisy indicator though, so uninformed
traders are unlikely to discover the precise trading intentions of
their informed counterparties.  Moreover, if informed traders
can keep some of their informational advantage, they will have
incentives to acquire such information in the first place 
(eg through research) and be more willing to contribute to
liquidity. 
Market microstructure theory shows that increasing disclosure
in the form of greater pre-trade or post-trade transparency
may have ambiguous effects on liquidity (see the sections on
pre and post-trade transparency).
Execution costs and uncertainty
This may result from the fact that buy and sell orders are often
not perfectly synchronised.  Market makers can reduce the
costs to market participants arising from execution uncertainty
by allowing market participants to trade immediately rather
than having to wait for a counterparty.  But in doing so they
will incur inventory risk (or market risk).  Bid-ask spreads
provide a compensation for this risk.
During periods of increased price volatility, market makers may
widen their bid-ask spreads or even refrain from providing
sufficient liquidity.  In turn, market participants may decide to
stay away, as execution risk is higher.  In other words, liquidity
is less resilient in markets that see sharp falls in participation
during volatile market conditions. 
(1) See for example O’Hara (1995) and Madhavan (2000) for a survey.338 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q4
rules are less effective in a model that relies on dealers’
willingness to commit their own capital.  Regulators also allow
platform operators to use access rules as a risk management
tool, for example to ensure that participants meet the credit
standards of the platform operator, provided the rules are
objective and transparent (IOSCO (2011)).  They further
specify conditions under which platform operators can set
discretionary execution rules that allow price discrimination.
Dealer competition
In principle, increased use of multi-dealer platforms will make
it easier for clients to compare multiple price sources.  This in
turn could lead to greater competition between dealers, which
in turn might affect liquidity provision.  Again, academic work
provides useful insights on the factors at work.
Early theoretical papers assumed dealers were competing for
client orders.(1) In these, typically quite stylised, models,
liquidity improves (in the form of narrower bid-ask spreads) 
as the number of market makers increases.  Prices reveal
available information more readily and adverse selection risk is
reduced.  
Later theoretical models show that dealers may quote wider
bid-ask spreads (see for example Viswanathan and Wang
(2002)), or reduce the amount of liquidity they supply to the
market (Biais, Martimort and Rochet (2000)), when
competition is reduced.  These models suggest that
competitive behaviour is restored as the number of dealers
increases, with volumes increasing and bid-ask spreads
narrowing.  Empirical research supports these findings,
although some papers find the effect to be small, suggesting
that it is relatively difficult for new dealers to capture market
share from the incumbents.(2)
But matters become more complicated when introducing
more institutional detail.  Theoretical work shows that 
quote-driven models (such as the RFQ model) and 
order-driven models (such as the inter-dealer limit order book)
have very different properties in terms of liquidity, thus
providing theoretical support for a trading environment that
offers choice to market participants.
Viswanathan and Wang (2002) show that in a market with
many dealers, small orders fetch better prices in the 
order-driven market, whereas large orders do better in the
quote-driven market.  Their insights are illustrated in Figure 1,
which depicts the demand schedules of dealers in a 
quote-driven market (the green line) and in an order-driven
market (the red line).  For every quantity of the asset that a
customer wants to sell, these lines give the price at which the
dealer is willing to buy the offered quantity.  For a small order,
the customer will get a higher price when selling in the 
order-driven market (the red line lies above the green one), for
a large order, he will prefer the quote-driven market.  
The intuition is that an order in the quote-driven setting is
typically executed at a single price (which only reflects the size
of the trade in question), whereas in the limit order book, a
customer order will travel down (or up if buying) the limit
order book, starting from the highest posted bid (or lowest
posted ask) and picking up successively worse prices to
complete the order.  
Viswanathan and Wang (2002) also show that when the
number of dealers is small — eg when a stock is less actively
traded — dealers (quoting a single price) will no longer provide
competitive quotes.  But for the limit order book to be a viable
alternative, it needs to be supported by a sufficient number of
liquidity providers.  In other words, a limit order book can only
support a market with few dealers if total trading activity is
sufficiently high.
The authors conclude that their results provide justification for
a hybrid model, which offers customers a choice between
quote-driven and order-driven trade execution.
Although stylised, the model illustrates that it is difficult to
predict how a move from bilateral voice trading to electronic
trading, or from single-dealer to multi-dealer trading, will
affect the liquidity-competition relationship.  The precise
effect may depend on the number of dealers, on the trading
model and on trade sizes.  These factors are relevant in
derivatives markets where average trade sizes can be large, 
and where the number of dealers varies with trading interest




Bid schedules of order-driven and quote-driven markets 
Figure 1 Stylised demand schedules in order-driven and
quote-driven markets
Sources:  Bank of England and Viswanathan and Wang (2002).
(1) These early models assume Bertrand-type competition, with free entry and exit and
dealers earning zero profits.  
(2) See Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2005) for a survey.  It should be noted, however, that
many of the empirical studies are carried out in the context of quote-driven equity
markets (such as NASDAQ or the London Stock Exchange prior to 1997).Research and analysis OTC derivatives markets:  trading models and liquidity 339
Inter-dealer trading
A recent study of credit default swaps (Chen et al (2011)) finds
that dealers often need several days to hedge their large
customer trades.  Thus dealers in this market are subject to
significant market risk.  As explained in the third section, the
inter-dealer segment of OTC derivatives markets provides
dealers with an opportunity to rebalance their positions after
trading with their customers.  In doing so, dealers can reduce
their own market risk, and will be more inclined to provide
liquidity to their customers.  
Viswanathan and Wang (2004) model the interaction between
the customer and dealer segments of the market as a 
two-stage game, showing that inter-dealer trading can
improve liquidity.  In the first stage, dealers compete with one
another for customer business, and one dealer ‘takes it all’.  
In the second stage of their model, when trading in the 
inter-dealer market, the winning dealer attempts to maximise
revenue.  Being a monopolist (or having market power in
general) she achieves that by restricting quantities.  The
authors show that this in turn encourages all dealers to behave
competitively in the first round, resulting in better prices for
customers.  
Viswanathan and Wang (2004) also find the inter-dealer limit
order book model to be robust in a market with high
information asymmetries.  Having obtained an order from an
informed customer, a dealer using the order book can submit a
series of small orders and trade at multiple prices, as explained
earlier, starting from the best outstanding quotes.  In contrast,
a quote-driven market exacerbates adverse selection because
it restricts dealers to trading the entire order at a single price.
When worried about adverse selection risk, counterparties
may be unwilling to take the other side of the trade.  Hence
the authors find liquidity resilience to be higher in an 
inter-dealer market which relies on a limit order book.
Electronic platform trading and liquidity
resilience:  key challenges and concluding
remarks
As market participants prepare for the G20 mandated
transition from bilateral voice-based trading to electronic
platform trading, the nature of liquidity provision is likely to
change.  Given the systemic role of OTC derivatives, it is
important that liquidity on the trading platforms supporting
trading in this market is resilient, both during normal and
stressed market conditions. 
Moving trading from the bilateral environment to an exchange
or electronic trading platform represents a significant change.
It may include changes in transparency, in the relationship of
dealers with their customers, and in the liquidity available,
particularly during periods of market stress.   
This article has described a variety of models for OTC
derivatives trading.  Some already exist and their volumes are
increasing, others are still being developed.  The article has
shown that liquidity provision depends on many factors,
including the willingness of dealers to provide continuous
liquidity, their ability to manage the inventory risk arising 
from their role as market maker and the ability of customers 
to execute large or sensitive trades with minimum price
impact. 
Drawing on the academic literature, this article has shown that
trade-offs may arise between increasing transparency and/or
widening access on the one hand, and maintaining liquidity on
the other hand.  It has also shown that inter-dealer trading
supports liquidity provision to end-users.  And it has illustrated
how the relative benefits of quote-driven and order-driven
models may depend on several factors, including trade
frequency and dealer concentration.
Liquidity resilience, or the ability of a market to attract buyers
and sellers at all times, requires a model where the main
liquidity providers are willing to quote continuous prices, even
during periods of market stress.  For a platform to be liquidity
resilient, it needs liquidity providers who are confident that
they can manage their inventories without incurring undue
execution delays or adverse selection risk, compared to
bilateral trading, even as prices become more volatile.
Conceptually, such resilience can be achieved in different
trading models.  Academic studies show that liquidity
provision is more robust when market participants have a
choice between trading models.  In other words, liquidity
resilience is greater when liquidity providers have a choice on
how to trade.  This includes the ability for dealers to manage
their inventory risk via inter-dealer trading.
Anecdotal evidence from market participants indicates that
liquidity resilience can be maintained on electronic trading
platforms during periods of market stress, even though 
bid-ask spreads may widen.  But market participants also
underline the need for flexibility, including the ability to trade
via voice execution methods or in a dealers-only
environment.(1)
As regulators and market participants are preparing for the
implementation of the G20 objectives, it is important that the
trade-offs inherent in the different trading models are
recognised.
(1) IOSCO (2011) reaches a similar conclusion.340 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q4
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